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Chapter 4
How Does Retirement Planning Software
Handle Postretirement Realities?
Anna M. Rappaport and John A. Turner
Good retirement planning and management requires building assets and
deploying them well over a period of years. In the postretirement period,
there are many potential risks requiring that assets be used to generate
income under a range of uncertain outcomes. Retirement planning soft-
ware offers individuals and advisors the opportunity to perform a range of
calculations to help them in retirement planning. In this chapter, we first
offer an overview of postretirement risks, including information on how
they are perceived and understood by the public. Next we provide insights
into how retirement planning software assists individuals and their advisors
in evaluating these risks.1
The risks of retirement
A 2008 Society of Actuaries (SOA) study (2008c) identifies and describes
15 postretirement risks that span financial risks, changes in family status
and needs, changes in housing needs, policy changes, and risks from bad
advice, theft, and fraud. In this chapter, we focus on major financial risks,
in as much as these are the risks analyzed by planning software. Over the
period 2001–7, the evidence presented in the SOA study shows that pre-
retirees have consistently been more concerned about risk than retirees.
Furthermore, retirees have shown relatively little change in the level of
concern about risk over the four risk surveys. By contrast, preretirees
indicated growing concern from 2001 to 2003, but levels dropped back to
2001 levels by 2007. Rising concerns between 2001 and 2003 are believed to
reflect a combination of the terrorist event in September 2001 as well as
poor market conditions during that period (SOA 2008c). Top risk concerns
over the full period include inflation as well as health and long-term care
costs. Longevity is seen as a major risk concern by experts. These risks are
discussed below.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/8/2010, SPi
Longevity risk
There are two sides to longevity risk: the problem of outliving one’s assets
and the problem of dying early and not providing adequately for depen-
dent family members. Longevity can be predicted quite accurately in the
aggregate for a group of people, but it is impossible to predict accurately
for an individual. Table 4.1 shows the probability that one or both members
of a couple, both of whom are initially aged 65, will live to ages 80, 90, and
100. Public attitudinal research shows that many people underestimate
longevity risk – 40 percent underestimate population life expectancy by 5
years or more, and another 20 percent by 1–4 years (Cowell and Rappaport
2006).
Family history and own health are the key factors used by retirees and
those near retirement in estimating personal life expectancy, accounting
for over 80 percent of the top considerations (Cowell and Rappaport
2006). It appears unlikely that most people understand the variability of
longevity and have evaluated options for managing this risk. Some options
include investment strategies that preserve principal, payout annuities with
income guaranteed for the life of the survivor, and longer-term payouts
without lifetime guarantees. The choice of a strategy for managing the
payout period involves trade-offs between more versus less income, lifetime
guarantees, availability of a bequest, and control of assets (Rappaport
2008). For lower- and lower-middle-income retirees, deferring retirement
Table 4.1 Probability of survival (%) from age 65 to 80, 90, and 100:
status quo projections
Female Male Both One only
Panel 1: Probability of survival from age 65 in 2005
To age 80 75.30 64.70 48.70 91.30
To age 90 37.00 23.50 8.70 51.80
To age 100 4.20 1.50 0.10 5.60
Panel 2: Probability of survival from age 65 in 2025
To age 80 78.00 71.80 56.00 93.80
To age 90 41.20 29.80 12.30 58.70
To age 100 5.00 2.00 0.10 6.90
Panel 3: Probability of survival from age 65 in 2045
To age 80 80.40 77.80 62.60 95.60
To age 90 45.30 36.20 16.40 65.10
To age 100 5.70 2.50 0.10 8.10
Note : Calculations are based on UP 1994 Tables projected.
Source : Cowell and Rappaport (2006:16).
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and receipt of Social Security benefits is the most available strategy. The
strategies that retirees cited as most common for managing longevity risk
were elimination of consumer debt, paying off mortgages, trying to save as
much as possible, and cutting back on spending (Cowell and Rappaport
2006). Most try to manage this risk themselves rather than insuring it
(Cowell and Rappaport 2006). It appears that many individuals handling
their own retirement assets will be unable to manage their resources so as
to not outlive them, and financial advisors may not present a full range of
options.
Inflation risk
Inflation risk was the top concern of retirees in 2007, with 57 percent
very or somewhat concerned about inflation compared to 52 percent
concerned about having enough money to pay for a long stay in a
nursing home, and 51 percent concerned about having enough money
to pay for adequate health care. Among preretirees, the corresponding
levels of concern were 63, 63, and 69 percent, respectively (SOA 2008c).
As with longevity, averages do not tell the story well. The United States
experienced double-digit inflation in 1947, 1974, and 1979–81 (SOA
2008b).
Understanding and managing inflation risk requires better long-term
thinking and understanding of the time value of money than many
retirees have. Focus groups conducted with retirees having at least
$100,000 of assets to manage indicated that many of them had a
shorter-term focus, and did not factor in inflation, market volatility, or
longevity risk when deciding if they could afford to retire (Greenwald,
Bryck, and Sondergeld 2006: 6). Questions included in the 2004 Health
and Retirement Study show very low levels of financial literacy among
individuals at retirement ages. Only 18 percent of baby boomers were able
to answer the following question correctly: ‘Let’s say you have 200 dollars
in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per year.
How much would you have at the end of two years?’ (Lusardi and Mitchell
2007).
Delaying receipt of Social Security benefits is a relatively easy way to
increase inflation-indexed monthly income benefits, yet more than half
of Americans take Social Security at the earliest claiming age. Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and inflation-indexed annuities
are strategies for investing to hedge inflation risk, but neither are
commonly used. Many retirees have invested in housing and common
stocks, but neither are good hedges against inflation as shown during
2008.
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Investment risk
Also important are interest rate risk and stock market risk. Lower interest
rates tend to reduce retirement income because workers need to save more
to build up assets, retirees earn less income on investments such as certifi-
cates of deposit and bonds, reinvested income earns less, and annuities are
more expensive when long-term interest rates are low. Stocks offer the
potential for significant gain or loss, and have been a major source of
investment of defined contribution (DC) plan assets. Experts disagree
about the desirability of investing such assets in common stocks, and
the lineup of opinions is likely to change after the global financial crisis
of 2008 and beyond. In any event, individuals tend to overestimate future
investment returns. One study found that 401(k) participants anticipated a
5-year average return of 10.9 percent from US equities, 8.1 percent returns
on corporate bonds, 7.7 percent frommoney market funds, and 7.6 percent
from stable-value funds (Sondergeld and Greenwald 2005: 21).
Research by the John Hancock Life Insurance Company has shown
consistent misunderstanding of the features and characteristics of different
investments. For example, when asked what money market funds include,
only 9 percent correctly replied that a money market fund includes only
short-term investments. Further, respondents believed that the stock of
their employer was less risky than a diversified portfolio of stocks, and
they did not understand the relationship between changes in interest
rates and bond prices (SOA 2008c).
Health care and long-term costs
Paying for health and long-term care are consistently identified as top
retirement risk concerns. It is interesting that these are ranked similarly,
despite the fact that after age 65, Medicare pays for a substantial part of
acute health care while there is no universal program to pay for long-term
care services. Costs of both health care and medical care also vary greatly
across individuals, with a few users accounting for a great deal of the cost.
Long-term care is a serious issue. As shown in Table 4.2, men aged 65 and
older can expect to spend 1.5 years with mild or moderate disability on
average, and 1.5 years with severe disability. For women, the anticipated
periods of disability are 3.0 and 2.8 years. Most long-term care is provided
by family members or friends at home, but long-term care may also be
provided by paid caregivers at home, in nursing homes, in continuing care
retirement communities, in assisted living facilities, and at adult care
centers. For those with virtually no assets, Medicaid is a primary source of
financing long-term care. Privately purchased long-term care insurance
and private saving provide advance financing for the better-off. Relatively
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few buy insurance; however, only 28 percent of retirees say they have
purchased long-term care insurance, and 9 percent say they plan to, in
the 2007 Risks and Process of Retirement survey (SOA 2008c). Seventeen
percent of preretirees (age 45 and older) say they have purchased long-
term care insurance, and 23 percent say they plan to. This survey provides
higher positive responses compared to other sources.
Health care costs are much more likely to be covered by insurance than
are long-term care costs. Virtually, all Americans aged 65 and over have
Medicare coverage, and many purchase additional supplemental cover-
age. In the 2007 Risks and Process of Retirement survey, 61 percent of
retirees say they have purchased supplemental health insurance or partic-
ipate in an employer’s postretirement health plan, and 14 percent say
they plan to obtain coverage (SOA 2008c). Twenty-eight percent of pre-
retirees (age 45 and older) indicate they have purchased supplemental
health insurance or participate in an employer’s health plan; 50 percent
say they plan to do so. The most commonly cited strategy to protect
against financial health shocks is to maintain healthy habits: 75 percent
of retirees say they do this currently, and 23 percent say they plan to;
among preretirees, 69 percent say they do now, and 29 percent say they
plan to. Of course, as SOA (2008a: 8) notes, ‘maintaining healthy lifestyle
habits is an admirable goal, [but] in light of . . . increases in obesity, these
high percentages may be more indicative of wishful thinking than tangi-
ble action.’
Table 4.2 Expected periods of long-term care need and expected costs for
long-term care
Age All Healthy Mild/moderate
disability
Severe
disability
Panel 1: Remaining life expectancy in years by age, sex, and disability status
Male 65 15.3 12.3 1.5 1.5
85 5.7 2.9 1.0 1.8
Female 65 19.4 13.6 3.0 2.8
85 7.2 2.5 1.7 3.0
Panel 2: Estimated average lifetime costs of long-term care ($2,000)
Alla Users of
long-term care
servicesb
Male 29,000 127,000
Female 82,000 158,000
a 92% of these amounts are expected to be incurred during periods of severe disability.
b Highest lifetime costs average $300,000–750,000.
Source : Derived from SOA (2008a: 18, 20, 21).
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Health spending varies greatly by individual. It has been estimated that
10 percent of the population each year accounts for 60 percent of spending
on health services, and the half of the population with the lowest health
spending accounts for only 3 percent of health costs. At age 65, the
expected present value of lifetime health costs (in excess of Medicare)
per couple, where both are aged 65 and excluding long-term care, has
been estimated at $225,000 in 2008; these costs are projected to rise to
$284,000 by 2020 (SOA 2008a).
Incorporating nonfinancial assets
Housing is an extremely important component of wealth among middle-
income Americans. Among households aged 55–64 in the 25th–85th
percentiles by wealth, nonfinancial assets accounted for 68–75 percent of
their wealth (not including Social Security and defined benefit (DB) pen-
sions; Abkemeier and Hamann 2009). Table 4.3 shows both financial and
nonfinancial assets for middle-income individuals (in the 25th–75th
percentiles) and the well-off (75th–85th percentiles). For both groups,
nonfinancial assets (mainly residential housing) are two to three times as
large as financial assets (excluding pensions and Social Security; Abkemeier
and Hamann 2009). Despite this, existing planning software is incomplete,
in that it usually does not take explicit account of how housing wealth fits
Table 4.3 Wealth of middle-income, middle-aged households (age 55–64)
Household
type
Number of
households
(M)
Median
annual
income
($)
Median
net
worth
($)
NonFinancial
assets ($)
Financial
assets ($)
NonFinancial
assets as % of
net worth
Panel 1: Middle mass household segments (25–75% of all households)
Married 5.2 75,000 348,000 240,000 108,000 69
Single
female
2.5 28,000 111,000 75,000 36,000 68
Single male 1.4 41,000 125,000 89,000 36,000 71
Panel 2: Mass affluent household segments (75–85% of all households)
Married 1.0 132,000 1,300,000 884,000 416,000 68
Single
female
0.5 58,000 415,000 299,000 116,000 72
Single male 0.3 79,000 465,000 349,000 116,000 75
Source : Derived from Abkemeier and Hamann (2009) using 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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into retirement planning. Even when it does, housing wealth is handled in
very different ways (Sondergeld et al. 2003).
Behavioral finance provides a broader context for understanding that
individuals often have incomplete understanding of risks, and that they
often do not make decisions that are economically optimal. Retirement
planning software could work to combat this situation, but to date, available
programs do not appear to have taken due account of this opportunity.
An overview of retirement planning software
Many studies have looked at how much wealth people nearing retirement
have, and analysts often disagree over whether these amounts seem ade-
quate or inadequate.2 Hence it may not be surprising that retirement
planning software in the marketplace varies greatly in complexity, sophisti-
cation, and number of inputs required. Furthermore, retirement planning
challenges differ considerably across income levels. Lower-income indivi-
duals tend to have few assets, so they rely primarily on Social Security.
For them, the main retirement planning issues are when to stop working,
when to take Social Security, and how to limit spending. Middle-income
people with longer-term employment records may have employer-sponsored
retirement programs, own homes, andmust manage their saving so as to not
run out of money. This group is unlikely to have financial advice beyond
what employers provide at the workplace. And for those in higher-income
brackets, people with more assets are still concerned about having ade-
quate retirement income for their desired consumption, but they are also
concerned about tax issues and estate planning.
Previous analyses
A small prior literature has analyzed aspects of retirement planning soft-
ware. For instance, Bodie (2003) examines financial advice provided by
retirement planning software available on four major web sites, and con-
cludes that they have a pro-equity (pro-risk) bias. Kotlikoff (2006) evalu-
ated advice provided by four well-known, reputable financial services
companies, and he concludes that they all advised dramatic oversaving
compared to what workers would need to maintain a constant level of
consumption. Dowd, Atherly, and Town (2008) evaluate a dozen retire-
ment planning calculators and conclude that these calculators were weak
in their recognition and handling of health costs. In 2003, a joint study by
the SOA, Life Insurance and Market Research Association (LIMRA), and
the International Foundation for Retirement Education (InFRE) focused
on a mix of consumer programs and professional programs, including
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both programs available for purchase by advisors and proprietary programs
for use in a single organization (Sondergeld et al. 2003). And a 2009 SOA
and Actuarial Foundation study brought in a mix of web-based and profes-
sional programs.
Methodology
Typically, evaluative studies chose a set of programs to provide a sense of
the range of outcomes and use case studies with each program, to under-
stand how it operates, what a user would experience, and to compare
results.3 These cases are selected with the aid of financial planners in
order to reflect a mix of different situations similar to those encountered
in real life.
Types of software
A lot of software is now available over the Internet for free. We group the
programs evaluated into those providing advice about investments and
portfolios, advice on how much to save for retirement, and advice on
managing resources and risks in retirement. Some programs combine
two or all three of these capabilities. Programs also differ in their target
market (level of household income and complexity of household finances),
with some programs intended for households with relatively simple finances,
while others can handle fairly complex financial situations. The Internet has
revolutionized the transmission of information, including information on
retirement planning and risks. A new SOA and Actuarial Foundation study
(Turner andWitte forthcoming) is addressing the changing ways that people
receive computer-based assistance with retirement income planning.4 This
assistance is no longer limited to stand-alone programs, but now it includes
programs at web sites seeking to tailor information to users’ self-identified
needs. Professional software used by financial planners allows for analysis of
complex financial situations encountered by wealthy individuals. The free,
web-based software, by comparison, are best viewed as educational tools to
help users address major issues in financial planning, rather than for making
detailed projections.
Masking or understanding risks
Modeling approaches embodied in these software programs may be deter-
ministic, stochastic, or provide various different scenarios. The earlier
SOA/LIMRA/InFRE study concluded that most of the planning tools did
not recognize several key postretirement risks; in fact, often the programs
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mask risks instead of highlighting them. This would be true of the two-
thirds of the programs that used a deterministic approach; only one-third
used a stochastic approach. In a deterministic model, the program presents
a single outcome, without considering other possible outcomes resulting
from different circumstances (such as living longer than expected or the
stock market performing worse than expected).
Of course, even in a deterministic setting, multiple alternative scenarios
may be generated, but a user must take the initiative to do this which may
be time consuming and awkward. Turner and Witte (forthcoming) con-
clude that more programs today are using Monte Carlo techniques to take
into account financial market risk, but most programs still use a small
number of runs (500 or 1,000), and generally the only parameter that is
stochastic is the rate of return on financial markets. Thus, while Monte
Carlo techniques do offer additional and valuable information on financial
risks, there is room for improvement: multiple scenarios are needed to
explore variations in other risks. Only one family of programs examined
incorporated stochastic inflation as well as stochastic returns (including
returns on bonds), while another program incorporated stochastic life
expectancy and rates of return.
How the programs address postretirement risks
This section discusses how the programs evaluated differ in how they
handle key aspects of postretirement risk management.
Longevity
Many people underestimate their life expectancies: two-thirds of male
preretirees underestimated the life expectancy of the average 65-year-old
man, and 42 percent of that group underestimated it by 5 years or more
(SOA 2004). Among women, half (54 percent) of preretirees underesti-
mated the life expectancy of the average 65-year-old woman. For this
reason, there is a good chance that people will underestimate their own
life expectancies if they are asked to supply this information as an input to
financial planning software. Accordingly, they may need guidance from the
program in estimating their anticipated longevity.
Some of the free consumer-oriented programs supply a life expectancy
for the user but do not distinguish differences by sex.5 Even when they do
provide an age and sex-specific life expectancy, they tend not to recognize
that about half of the population will live beyond the average life expectan-
cy. Thus, longevity determines the length of one’s planning horizon and
retirement period, but it is generally not recognized as a risk. One program
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allows a user to estimate his or her life expectancy based on nine factors:
age, gender, marital status, height, weight, blood pressure, alcohol con-
sumption, use of tobacco products, and exercise. By varying the inputs, the
user can see how changes in health habits, such as losing weight, could
affect life expectancy. The software provides both life expectancy and the
age to which the user has a 25 percent probability of survival. This latter is a
desirable feature that most programs do not have. Given the importance of
longevity in financial planning, this is an area where programs could be
improved.
Length of planning horizon
Planning software programs take different approaches when determining
the length of the planning period relevant to the user. One ignores life
expectancy and calculates expenses to age 95; another assumes that retire-
ment lasts 30 years (ignoring differences in life expectancy between men
and women, and assuming that people who retire earlier die earlier). Still
another assumes that people live to their 25 percent life expectancy, which
is the age at which 25 percent of a birth cohort is still alive. And another
permits the user to determine his or her own life expectancy, which then
becomes the length of the planning period.
Naturally, if the planning period assumed for the computations is too
short, people may be forced to curtail their consumption at older ages. If
they have sufficient annuitized income (e.g., Social Security benefits), they
may not be too concerned about completely running out of money –
though they might run out of financial assets and have insufficient re-
sources to maintain their accustomed level of consumption. If the planning
period is set too long, people risk dying with extra resources, having given
up opportunities for consumption during their lifetime, but leaving extra
bequests to their heirs.
How long the planning horizon is anticipated to be relates to the
question of whether people purchase annuities to protect against out-
living their assets. In fact, in most developed nations, people rarely have
price-indexed annuities other than Social Security. In many countries,
those benefits do not provide high replacement rates (except for the low
lifetime wage workers). While insurers offer annuity products to generate
life income, the products tend to be complex, incorporating different
trade-offs including control over investments, liquidity, guarantee of life
income, guarantee of minimum returns, and level of bequest. Most exist-
ing financial planning software available to the consumer cannot analyze
the range of products for providing lifetime payouts nor analyze the
purchase of financial products.
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Inflation
None of the free consumer programs, and few of the professional programs
evaluated, treat inflation as a risk. That is, they assume that inflation is
constant over the period analyzed. In the professional programs, a higher
inflation rate than the default can be input, but some consumer programs
specify a single inflation rate. Only one professional program examined
offers the option of treating inflation as stochastic.
Medical and long-term care expenses
Some of the free web-based programs allow the user to input information
about expected medical and long-term care expenses. Yet none examined
by Turner and Witte (forthcoming) treats these expenses as a risk factor or
alerts the user to possibly huge variations in these expenses.
Social Security benefit receipt
In the United States, most people receive more in Social Security benefits
than from investments. Accordingly, the age at which the person claims
benefits and the decision whether or not to postpone taking benefits
becomes key. Unfortunately, most consumer-oriented programs do not
highlight this issue; rather, the user simply specifies the age he or she will
claim benefits.
A related point is that many financial planning tools do not accurately
determine each individual’s Social Security benefit. For instance, one
software tool simply presumes that everyone receives the same Social Secu-
rity benefit, regardless of whether it is a single or married household. Some
programs require the user to provide that information, but older workers
tend not to be very well apprised as to the level of their future Social
Security benefits (Mitchell 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier 2003). Indeed,
the research shows that many workers underestimate their Social Security
benefit and overestimate howmuch income they will receive from pensions
and work in retirement (Sondergeld and Greenwald 2005). Focusing on
those within 2 years of benefit receipt, Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2004)
find that about 30 percent did not know what their Social Security benefits
would be, and of those who said they did, half were accurate to within
10 percent of their actual benefits. One-quarter overestimated their future
benefits by 10 percent or more.
It is the case that the programs often recommend postponing the age at
which Social Security benefits are taken, if retirement savings are inadequate.
One web site inputs the user’s age and sex, and calculates the ‘break-even’
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point if benefit receipt were postponed from age 62 to the normal retire-
ment age (66 for a person, currently 59 years old). It notes that a person
with average life expectancy for their age and gender has a given percent-
age chance of living longer than the break-even point, with the likelihood
of living longer than that age being higher for women than for men.
It would be useful to integrate more detail on longevity risks with the
discussion of the benefit claiming age. Moreover, that program does not
calculate (or even note), that the optimal claiming age depends on wheth-
er the user has a dependent spouse or is a dependent spouse. More
detailed information is provided in a separate document, including the
option of purchasing a 5-year fixed-term annuity as a bridge from 62 to 67
in order to postpone receipt of Social Security benefits. This option of
purchasing an annuity is noted in the software provided by a life insurance
company.
One program suggests that everyone would be better off in terms of
lifetime benefits received by postponing receipt of retirement benefits past
age 62. A substantial portion of the population, however, has life expectan-
cy less than the mean. Many of these people would not receive higher
lifetime benefits by postponing retirement. In addition, many women
would be better off taking Social Security at age 62 on their own earnings
records and then claiming spousal benefits at a later date, with their
husbands postponing retirement. Some of the consumer programs have
no option for separately entering information for spouses. Thus, they are
incapable of assessing the issues of whether the survivor has adequate
income, economies of scale in consumption, and the decline in family
consumption following the death of a spouse.
Poor planning
Financial planning software programs are designed to reduce the risk of
poor planning, but few programs have checks on inconsistent or outland-
ish assumptions. This may be less of an issue for professional programs
because a professional financial planner is inputting the data, but some
internal consistency checks are important for the consumer programs.
For example, many programs permit the user to specify long-term risk-
free rates of return of 10 or even 20 percent.
A common problem with many consumer software programs is that most
do not recognize users’ low level of knowledge documented by numerous
behavioral studies. That is, the programs are designed for knowledgeable
users and may yield misleading results for many users. For example, users
who underestimate their life expectancies and hence draw down their
assets too soon will possibly outlive their assets in retirement.
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Targets
A key aspect of retirement planning and retirement planning software has
to do with the criteria for deciding whether retirement saving is adequate.
Adequacy criteria involve the goal to be achieved and the probability that it
will be achieved. Programs generally are based on the approach of deter-
mining whether the user is on the right path to meet a particular goal, with
the goal either determined by the user or by the program. They have some
criteria for determining whether savings are adequate. The next section
discusses aspects of the target criteria for measuring success in retirement
planning.
How the programs measure success
Whether one is successful in meeting one’s retirement planning target
depends on what measure of success is used. This will in general depend
on the length of the planning period, the measure of income/asset ade-
quacy, and the probability that adequacy will be achieved over the entire
planning period. Furthermore, one’s estimate of success will vary with risk
aversion, rate of time preference, and mortality risk.
The software programs differ widely in what they deem success. One
program that uses Monte Carlo analysis suggests that the goal is an 80 percent
chance that income will last to age 95, given a 70 percent target replacement
rate. A different nonstochastic program defines success as having suffi-
cient resources to meet the user’s specified target expenditure level, up to
the user’s specified life expectancy. A third program defines success as a
90 percent chance that the desired level of retirement income, based on
an 85 percent target replacement rate, can be sustained over a 30-year
retirement. Thus, for a person retiring at age 65, that would be a 90 percent
chance of success up to age 95.
Sometimes, programs use measures of retirement income adequacy to
measure success, including the replacement ratio. This refers to the ratio of
postretirement income to the employee’s preretirement pay. For some, a
constant replacement ratio may make sense, but it will not be a good guide
if retirement spending is anticipated to change significantly due to lifestyle
choices, not needing to pay for dependent children, or having paid off a
mortgage. One approach, taken by some software programs, divides retire-
ment consumption into ‘necessary’ and ‘desired’ expenses, on the notion
that people would be able to reduce desired expenses more readily than
necessary expenses. Another way to measure what is ‘necessary’ uses the
Elder Economic Security Index (Kuriansky 2007). This standard defined
the elder standard per year for a single person who owned a home without
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a mortgage at $15,134 in 2006, for a single renter at $19,541, for a couple
with a home without a mortgage at $21,658, and for a couple renting at
$26,064.
Of course, what is necessary and desired is also a subjective concept, so
more research is needed on ways to measure and explain different success
concepts. An important question is whether the measure of success should
be specified by the program or the user. Perhaps multiple outcomes would
be useful to alert the user to different ways in which the goal and shortfalls
can be defined.
Why projected outcomes differ
Based on what we have found thus far, it will not be surprising that retire-
ment planning programs differ in terms of their results and advice. One
reason is that their input values differ. While this explanation is obvious, the
reasons behind it are not. For example, one program uses a rate of return of
10 percent on equity, while another program has a default rate of return of
5 percent on equity and a maximum allowable rate of 7 percent. Some
programs recognize that the price of medical care is rising faster than other
prices, while others do not. Another issue is that the measures of retirement
resources differ. For example, one program asks the user to indicate expected
inheritances or other onetime receipts, while others do not mention ex-
pected inheritances. Some incorporate the value of housing as a source of
retirement income, while others do not. Many consumer-oriented programs
ignore taxes, leading one to conclude that the user has more retirement
resources than in reality. Programs that request more detail in the inputs for
sources of income may tend to yield a higher probability of success because
users end up specifying a higher level of expected income in retirement.
Also, as noted earlier, projected outcomes differ since measures of
retirement needs also differ. One program specifies a replacement rate of
85 percent, while another program allows the user to specify the amount of
income needed in retirement. Similarly, replacement rate definitions dif-
fer: some specify replacement rates relative to current income, while others
specify postretirement relative to lifetime average income. Further, retire-
ment planning periods differ across programs. One will stipulate a retire-
ment planning period of 30 years, while another specifies a period that
ends at age 95; yet another will base computations on the user’s specifica-
tion of life expectancy. A related point is that there is disparate treatment
of surviving spouses’ needs. Some programs set as a default that the
surviving spouse needs half the income of a couple, while one program
takes into account economies of scale in consumption, assuming that
a couple needs 1.6 times as much as a single person.
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Another source of differentiation is whether the models used are deter-
ministic or stochastic. Stochastic programs recognize the possibility of
worst-case scenarios, while deterministic programs do not explicitly incor-
porate that possibility in their methodology. And even in stochastic pro-
grams, the standard for the minimum probability of success differs. For
example, one program requires that the user be successful in 90 percent of
the scenarios, while other programs use lower standards.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed how postretirement risk is handled by widely
available retirement planning software. The programs evaluated here have
entailed enormous programming and design efforts, and in that sense, they
represent a remarkable achievement. At the same time, these are still in the
relatively early stages; and future programs will likely be greatly improved.
In overview, and not surprisingly, we find that web-based programs
aimed at the general consumer are less complex than programs used by
professional financial planners. The five free web-based approaches con-
sidered here provide a rough idea of whether the user is on target for
retirement, how much additional, if any, he or she would need to save, and
whether he or she should consider postponing retirement. Yet one has a
serious flaw in that it assumes that everyone, even if married, receives the
same Social Security benefit. Another is inadequate in that it determines
income sufficiency based on life expectancy and overlooks the chances of
living longer. Several do not even permit calculations to take spouses’
benefits and needs into account. Only one includes DC plan saving but
ignores DB pensions or other sources of retirement income. Programs
used by financial planners are far more complex, yet none is capable of
dealing with variable rate mortgages. Nor do they anticipate the situation of
falling housing prices, job loss, and foreclosures. We conclude that on the
whole, the tools do not highlight nor address retirement risk particularly
well; rather, they mainly mask risk.
A common problem with the consumer software programs evaluated is
that most do not recognize the users’ low level of financial knowledge. As a
result, the programs tend to be designed to work best for knowledgeable
users but they may produce misleading results for many. For example, users
who fail to understand their longevity may underestimate the amount of
resources they need for retirement. Future programs that confront limita-
tions in individual knowledge and understanding could check user-provided
inputs and provide warnings if these seem out of line. It would also be useful
to provide consumers with outcomes from running multiple scenarios, and
discuss the potential impact of inflation and health risks. Having said that, it
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remains the case that even experts may disagree on what financial targets are
best, and hence what advice may be optimal. No wonder then that software
developers disagree on how to attain goals.
The global financial crisis has prompted many to pay new attention to
the downside potential of investment risk. It has also revealed key weak-
nesses inherent in retirement planning software. Partly this is the result of
deterministic approaches, which fail to prompt scenario testing. Yet even
when stochastic modeling is preferred, the existing models still do not
focus people on rare or ‘tail’ events, and how to deal with them. Further-
more, stochastic approaches currently in use tend to focus on financial
market risks, but downplay or ignore other risks. An additional issue is that
the crisis has induced many to consider working longer and delaying
retirement, but few software models properly model and present this
option. The crisis has also made it clear that housing values can fall, and
variable rate mortgages can rise rapidly – yet neither eventuality is well
handled by most programs. And finally, virtually no program has contem-
plated the possibility of all of these negative shocks happening at the same
time – and just when the person loses his or her job. In short, existing
retirement planning programs have a long way to go. They still under-
represent, or downplay, the impact of multiple extreme events and what to
do about them. The next generation of software therefore has much to do
to inform users of such uncertainties and offer new solutions.
Appendix 4A Case studies
Case studies can help researchers understand the operation and results of
the software programs used in retirement planning. The question, ‘Will
I run out of money in retirement?’ is often the most critical one for retirees
and people nearing retirement. Given their circumstances and their plans
for the future, how likely are they to be able to maintain their standard of
living? This issue was addressed through the use of case studies developed
for the 2009 SOA Research Study (Turner and Witte forthcoming) by the
Project Oversight Group for comparing retirement software. They may be
characterized in brief as follows:
 Case 1. Sue Singleton, a 60-year-old divorcee, still working. This case
involves issues of working past age 65, changes in Social Security
benefits with postponed retirement, using the home as a primary
retirement asset, no employer retirement plan, reverse mortgage for
retirement income, and Social Security benefits based on divorce and
prior marriage.
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 Case 2. Hal and Karen Middleton, ages 64 and 60, recently retired.
This case involves issues of being too conservatively invested through
retirement, spending a sizable part of assets early in retirement, annu-
ity income stream reduced upon death of husband, and change in
health coverage at Medicare eligibility.
 Case 3. Gary and Sandra Alterman, ages 74 and 74, retired. This
case involves issues of long-term care needs, 40 percent of retire-
ment income does not have a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA),
liquidating home value through move in retirement; increasing
medical, assisted living, and transportation costs as time goes on,
and elimination of spousal pension benefit upon death of primary
wage earner.
 Case 4. Leslie Gonzalez, a 58-year-old widow, still working, dependent
mother. This case involves issues of increasing dependent costs, long
life, does not own home, the majority of her retirement assets being in
a taxable, low-earning account, different annuitization versus asset
investment/withdrawal strategies, and health benefits from former
husband’s employment.
 Case 5. John and Judy Richman, ages 56 and 50, higher income, still
working. This case involves issues of high credit card debt and mort-
gage going into retirement, college costs at the same time as the need
to save for retirement, employer stock options, lack of long-term care
insurance, not being able to afford retiring at age 65, and Social
Security spouse benefits where spouse is a government employee not
covered by Social Security.
 Case 6. Jim and Linda Goldin, ages 72 and 69, higher income,
retired.
Case study results
The research used the six cases in each program to determine how long it
would take to run out of money in each scenario. Results varied widely. For
one case, one program assesses that when retirement occurs at age 70 the
person has adequate retirement income, while another program finds the
income to be insufficient. The differences are explained at least in part
because the first program allows the user to set life expectancy, and uses life
expectancy to determine the planning period, while the second program
sets the planning period to end at age 95, 8 years later, or 47 percent
longer, than in the first study.
For a case of a recently retired couple aged 60 and 64, one program
finds the couple’s saving to be inadequate, while another finds it to be
adequate. The program that finds it to be adequate recognizes the value
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of the home equity as a source of retirement income, while the other
software does not. The first study found that consumer programs tended
to completely overlook home equity. For the couple aged 56 and 50 who
were still working, one program finds the couple’s saving to be inadequate,
while another finds it to be adequate. The one that finds it to be inadequate
sets a maximum rate of return of 7 percent on investments, while the other
allows the 8 percent specified in the case. Differences in assumed rates of
return are more important the younger the users and the more financial
assets they have.
To further explore the difference in results between deterministic and
stochastic programs, in one case the person is aged 55, plans to retire at
age 62, has a life expectancy of 95, has a salary of $100,000, and annual
saving of $12,000. Again, a deterministic and a stochastic program were
compared. The deterministic program indicated that the person would
be able to retire if he or she had already accumulated $740,000, while the
stochastic program indicated that he or she would need to have already
accumulated $690,000. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the stochastic
programs indicate that people need greater saving than do the determin-
istic programs.
Software analyzed in the 2009 SOA study
Free consumer programs
 Fidelity’s Retirement Income Planner http://personal.fidelity.com/
planning/retirement/retiree/content/ripover.shtml
 AARP Retirement Planning Calculator http://www.aarp.org/money/
financial_planning/sessionseven/retirement_planning_calculator.
html
 MetLife Calculator http://www.metlife.com/Applications/Corporate/
WPS/CDA/PageGenerator/0,4773,P18280,00.html
 US Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration:
Taking the Mystery Out of Retirement Planning http://askebsa.dol.
gov/retirementcalculator/UI/general.aspx
 T. Rowe Price Retirement Income Calculator http://www.troweprice.
com/common/index3/0,3011,lnp%253D10002%2526cg%
253D1270%2526pgid%253D8277,00.html
Fee-based consumer program (included with professional programs)
 ESPlanner http://www.esplanner.com/
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Professional programs
 NaviPlan Standard
http://www.eisi.com/products/us/standard/product_features.htm
 NaviPlan Extended
http://www.eisi.com/products/us/extended/index.htm
 NaviPlan Profiles
http://www.eisi.com/products/us/professional/index.htm
 PIE’s MoneyGuidePro
 http://www.moneyguidepro.com/Default.aspx?page=products
 AdviceAmerica – AdvisorVision Retirement Income Edition
http://www.adviceamerica.com/AAweb/RIE.htm
 Money Tree
http://www.moneytree.com/
Notes
1 This chapter relies on several surveys conducted by the Society of Actuaries
(SOA) examining how the public views retirement risks in 2001, 2003, 2005, and
2007; the SOA also ran several focus groups on how people manage their
retirement assets. Additional information was derived from a 2003 analysis by
the SOA, LIMRA (a US-based marketing and research organization serving over
850 financial services companies in over 70 countries), and the International
Foundation for Retirement Education on the handling of postretirement risks
by planning software (Sondergeld et al. 2003). Ongoing work (Turner andWitte
2009) builds on the first study to further show how such software treats the
management of postretirement risks. Results from the 2009 study are prelimi-
nary and have not yet been finally approved by the sponsoring organizations.
The software used in the 2009 study is listed in Appendix 4A.
2 For a recent review, see Mitchell and Turner (2009).
3 The case studies for the 2009 study can be found in Appendix 4A.
4 Programs compared in the 2009 study are listed in Appendix 4A.
5 Other differences in longevity are also considerable, with differences of a decade
or more across identifiable demographic and economic groups, for example, low-
income African-American men compared to high-income Asian women (Murray
et al. 2006).
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